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Abstract
We present empirical evidence on the funding and portfolio allocation of around 200 Dutch
corporate pension funds over the period 1996-2005, with a special focus on the influence of the
sponsoring firm. We find that unprofitable and small firms contribute less to their pension
funds than profitable and large firms, consistent with theories of capital market imperfections.
Sponsor contributions are found to be positively correlated with leverage, suggesting that tax
effects play a role. Defined benefit funds invest relatively more in equity and less in bonds than
their defined contribution counterparts, which is in accordance with the risk shifting theory.
JEL CODES : G23, G32
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1 Introduction
Ongoing rises in life expectancy, volatility in stock markets, and historically
low capital market interest rates have caused funding problems over the past decade
for defined benefit pension plans in many countries. In the Netherlands, with the
world’s largest defined benefit pension funding system, the funding and portfolio
allocation of pension funds are a constant concern. When a defined pension fund
faces a funding shortage, it has only three possibilities. It can raise the level of con-
tributions, limit the adjustment of benefits to the rate of wage inflation or, as a last
resort, cut benefits.
Most pension funds in the Netherlands are corporate pension funds, the con-
tributions to which are paid partly by the company’s employees and partly by
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the employer, the so-called ‘sponsoring company’. Employees and the employer are
represented in the pension fund’s board and share responsibility for pension fund
management. The prudential supervisor sets minimum required funding levels for the
pension fund and checks whether it meets these requirements.
In this paper, the funding and portfolio allocation of corporate pension
funds are investigated, with special focus on the relation with the sponsoring firm.
We test several hypotheses on the influence of the sponsoring company on funding
and portfolio allocation of its defined benefit pension fund. We specifically
test whether pension funding is affected by the profitability, leverage or size of
the sponsoring company, and whether the pension fund’s asset allocation
toward more risky securities such as equity is related to the sponsoring company’s
leverage.
The existing empirical studies in this area are mostly for the US and often cover a
relatively short time span. Although all of these studies address the asset allocation of
pension plans, only a few cover pension funding as well. The results are also quite
mixed. For example, Friedman (1983), using a broad sample of US firms for 1977,
documents that the level of pension funding is negatively related to sponsor profit-
ability, whereas Bodie et al. (1987), using data on around 500 US firms for 1980, find
that the level of pension funding is positively related to companies’ long-run profit-
ability. With respect to pension asset allocation, Bodie et al. (1987) report that pen-
sion assets of more risky firms are more heavily invested in equity, while Friedman
(1983) finds the opposite. Petersen (1996), using US data for 1988–1990, concludes
that defined benefit pension funds invest more in safe assets if the sponsoring firms
are less profitable and more in risky assets if the firms have high earnings. Gallo and
Lockwood (1995) and Rauh (2009), using US data over longer periods (1981–1987
and 1990–2003, respectively), confirm Friedman’s finding. Gallo and Lockwood
find that risky firms tend to offset firm risk by investing more in fixed income
securities and Rauh reports that firms with low credit ratings and underfunded
funds allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities, whereas
firms with high credit ratings and well-funded pension plans invest more heavily in
equity. Contrary to these findings, Cocco and Volpin (2007), using cross-section
data on 90 UK pension funds for 2002, report that pension plans of leveraged firms
invest a higher proportion in equities and receive smaller contributions from the firm.
As suggested by Rauh, these conflicting results for the US and the UK probably
reflect different institutional settings in both countries, particularly the absence in the
UK of mandatory supplementary firm contributions if the pension fund gets under-
funded.
In the Netherlands, mandatory supplementary firm contributions are absent as
well, making it interesting to look into the Dutch case. The dominance of defined
benefit pension schemes, the absence of public pension benefit insurance and of
restrictive regulation concerning sponsoring companies’ contributions, and a fixed
50/50 representation of the pension fund’s board by employer and employee, make
the Dutch system particularly interesting for the research problem at hand. The ab-
sence of mandatory supplementary firm contributions in the Netherlands means there
is scope for the full range of contribution rates and hence allows an unrestricted test
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of economic hypotheses with respect to funding by the sponsor. The 50/50 rep-
resentation of the pension fund’s board by employer and employee offers the possi-
bility to test whether employees on balance are able to counteract the influence of
corporate incentives.
We contribute to the literature by investigating the effects of sponsor character-
istics on both pension asset allocation and pension funding, using a combined dataset
on around 200 Dutch corporate pension funds and their sponsoring firms over the
years 1996–2005. Hence, the difficult years 2000–2002 of low stock market sentiment
(the dotcom crash) and low interest rates are included in the sample. The availability
of supervisory data on required assets of individual pension funds allows a more
accurate measurement of the funding status of pension funds than is usual in previous
studies.1 Our study is the first to address the issue of the relationship between sponsor
and pension finance – sponsor contributions and asset allocation – for the
Netherlands. The existing empirical literature on Dutch pension funds until now has
focused on asset allocation (e.g. de Dreu and Bikker, 2009; Bikker et al. 2011;
De Haan and Kakes, 2011), leaving aside the impact of the financial position of the
sponsoring firm, and without much concern for pension funding as such. For a
country with a huge and still largely defined benefit pension sector like the
Netherlands, this left an important gap in the literature that our current work fills.
The results for pension funding suggest that unprofitable and small firms contrib-
ute less to their pension funds than profitable and large firms, consistent with theories
of capital market imperfections. Sponsor contributions are found to be positively
correlated with leverage, suggesting that tax effects play a role. The results for pen-
sion asset allocation indicate that defined benefit funds invest relatively more in
equity and less in bonds than their defined contribution counterparts, which is in
accordance with the risk shifting theory. We do not find any significant effects of
leverage on pension asset allocation decisions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we give a brief review of the existing
theoretical literature on the relationship between pension finance and sponsoring
firms and formulate our hypotheses, which are drawn directly from the theories. Then
we sketch the institutional setting, including features of the Dutch pension system
and some regulatory aspects, and discuss its implications for the hypotheses. Next, we
outline the methodology and data used and present our empirical results for pension
funding and portfolio allocation, respectively.
2 Theory and hypotheses
In this section, we discuss the theory of defined benefit plan governance and propose
hypotheses regarding the influence of sponsoring companies on the funding and
portfolio allocation of pension funds (for clarity, the hypotheses are italicized). In
general, we distinguish four perspectives in the literature, namely risk shifting, risk
management, tax incentives and capital market imperfections.
1 Due to the introduction of the Financial Assessment Framework, 2005 is the last year for which com-
parable data is available.
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2.1 Risk shifting
A key feature determining behaviour of the sponsors of a defined benefit pension
fund is that the pension plan contains embedded options that lead to an incentive for
risk shifting, suggesting that moral hazard in many cases will induce risk taking in the
pension fund (Rauh, 2009).
For example, Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) highlight that the shareholders of
a company sponsoring a defined benefit pension plan own a put option. If the assets
of the company and the fund fall short of the pension fund liabilities, the sponsoring
company has a put option to give these assets to the pension beneficiaries as payment
and liquidate the pension fund. Since the value of each option increases with the risk
of the underlying assets, the sponsoring company has an incentive to increase the risk
of the assets (of the company and the fund) beyond what is optimal for the pension
plan participants, as well as to underfund the pension fund by contributing less to the
fund. Hence defined benefit plans will invest more in equity than a corresponding defined
contribution plan.
Cocco and Volpin (2007) show that the financial structure of the firm should also
affect the asset mix of the pension fund. According to the agency theory, equity
holders of highly leveraged firms prefer risky projects, as this entails a wealth transfer
from debt to equity holders. Such projects would evidently also include the asset mix
of the pension fund, since with more leverage the put option is closer to being ‘ in the
money’. As a result, leveraged firms will invest more pension assets in equity.
Meanwhile, Webb (2007) notes that pension plan liabilities are similar to long-
term debt. Accordingly, pension plan deficits that must be funded are a debt
burden to the sponsoring firm (whereas surpluses and unfunded deficits are sources of
equity – in effect a call option). The sponsoring company may thus have an incentive
to favour shareholders by reducing contributions to the fund, thus minimizing
funds payable to such ‘debt’ holders. The outcome is underfunding. This is true for
all pension funds, but the incentive is stronger for a highly leveraged firm, given the
high obligations the firm already has, implying a negative relation of sponsor con-
tributions to leverage. A corollary of lower sponsor contributions will be a larger
dividend payout. Whereas a minimum funding requirement may reduce the danger of
underfunding, it may lead instead to greater risk in the pension fund’s investment
policy.
Looking more closely at embedded options in defined benefit pension plans,
Kocken (2006) points out that defined benefit pension plans involve two more em-
bedded options besides the default option described by Treynor (1977). First, if the
defined benefit pension plan contract includes a guarantee from the sponsor to make
supplementary payments in case the fund’s funding ratio drops below some pre-
specified level, there is a guarantee option. Second, there is the conditional indexation
option, which can be exercised if the funding ratio drops below some pre-specified
level. The exercise of all three types of options is triggered by various values of the
fund’s funding ratio, making the volatility of this ratio a key variable to the option
values. The volatility of the funding ratio in turn will be determined by the fund’s
asset mix to a considerable extent.
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However, Kocken’s guarantee option is not ‘hard’ and cannot be exercised
by Dutch pension funds because mandatory supplementary contributions are
absent in the Netherlands, as will be explained in Section 3. Supplementary con-
tributions by the sponsor are voluntary. Broeders (2010) assumes supplementary
sponsor contributions to be conditional on the financial position of the sponsor
and corrects the market value of the guarantee option for the financial ability of
the sponsor to pay these. In that case he shows that the pension fund should
reduce risk taking, by investing in less risky assets, if the sponsor has a high
risk profile, which may be proxied by high leverage or low credit rating.
Accordingly, pension funds’ bond holdings will be positively related to sponsoring firms’
leverage.
2.2 Risk management
Against the risk-shifting view highlighted above, Rauh (2009) opposes the ‘risk
management’ view, according to which incentives for risk shifting are limited by costs
of financial distress for the sponsoring firm. He argues that when pension funds are
underfunded, mandatory supplementary sponsor contributions may drive the spon-
sor into financial distress. This is because the firm must continue to finance the fund
with liquid resources, thus increasing the risk of defaulting on non-pension debts.
Cash drains from mandatory supplementary contributions will also depress capital
investment of the firm (Rauh, 2006). Hence, according to the risk management view,
highly leveraged firms with poorly funded pension plans should invest more in bonds.
Rauh (2009) finds evidence for the risk management view as US firms with poorly
funded pension plans, high firm leverage and weak credit ratings tend to invest more
pension assets in bonds.
2.3 Tax incentives
The option-based incentive to invest in equity highlighted in the risk-shifting
perspective may also be partly offset by the tax advantages of holding debt securities
in the (tax-exempt) pension fund, which provide an incentive for a defined benefit plan
to invest in bonds (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981). Indeed, a firm might optimally lever up
and invest the proceeds in the pension fund in the form of bonds, thereby funding
pension liabilities to the maximum extent possible and implying that a positive
relationship of sponsor contributions to leverage may arise from tax effects.2 Such
incentives do not apply to the same extent in defined contribution funds where
returns all belong to the participants.3
2 We note an alternative argument that the relationship could be negative (all else being equal) if, when
firms are highly leveraged, the marginal tax rates are low and therefore there is no (tax) benefit from
increasing pension contributions.
3 However, as shown by Harrison and Sharpe (1983), the incentive to invest in debt is mitigated where there
is a possibility of default on pension obligations and pension benefit insurance, as benefit insurance in
effect subsidises the risk of an equity-based investment approach.
Pension fund finance and sponsoring companies 443
2.4 Capital market imperfections
An alternative view to those discussed above for pension incentives is based on
capital market imperfections, which draws in turn on optimal contract theory.
Cooper and Ross (2002) regard a firm as rationally desiring to provide its risk-averse
workers with a substitute for insurance and borrowing opportunities that are missing
or costly due to capital market imperfections. To this end, the risk-neutral firm pro-
vides a labour contract facilitating employees ’ consumption smoothing over time and
over states of nature, in retirement as well as during working life. The firm sets up a
pension fund to do this because it cannot credibly commit to providing funds itself to
employees in retirement; the fund is a commitment device as the firm cannot use the
pension funds’ assets for other purposes.
From the perspective of optimal contracts, the firm would have no incentive
to underfund pensions with perfect capital markets. Following the literature
that shows that real decisions of the firm are dependent on financial conditions
when capital markets are imperfect (e.g. Bernanke et al. 1999), Cooper and Ross
(2002) argue that funding is an investment made on behalf of employees and
hence will depend on financial conditions the firm faces. In effect, the firm may have
incentives to borrow from the pension fund by not funding it sufficiently.
Accordingly, corporate pension funds may be underfunded in circumstances
when the sponsoring company makes little or no profits, and is not able to
borrow (e.g. due to high leverage). So sponsor contributions will be positively related
to sponsoring firms’ profitability and negatively related to sponsoring companies’
leverage.
Cooper and Ross (2002) also argue that if the likelihood of borrowing constraints
depends in turn on firm size (as in Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), larger firms are more
likely to fully fund their pension scheme. Furthermore, firms may underfund the pension
plan if the profitability of the pension fund is relatively low.4,5
Another relevant aspect of optimal contracting is in terms of risk sharing
between employers and workers. Relaxing Cooper and Ross’s assumption of
a risk neutral employer, Arnott and Gersovitz (1980) suggest that a risk-averse
firm may have underfunded pension funds as a way to share risk with risk-
averse workers. Such risk aversion is most likely for smaller firms (e.g., Kihlstrom
and Laffont, 1979) so sponsor contributions will be positively related to
firm size. Arnott and Gersovitz also suggest that firms with underfunded
pension funds have an incentive to shift even more risk to workers by taking on more
4 If the investment yield on the pension fund’s portfolio is lower than the yield on the financial market,
there would be an opportunity cost to the sponsor’s funding of the pension plan. The above analysis
applies in the absence of public pension insurance. Cooper and Ross (2003) show that in the presence of
benefit insurance, the incentive to underfund is increased, owing to moral hazard. Without insurance it is
only firms that have insufficient capital that underfund, but with benefit guarantees all firms have an
incentive to reduce their contributions.
5 Bergstresser et al. (2006) show that US sponsoring firms manipulate earnings forecasts by assuming
relatively high long-term rates of return on pension assets, and that higher assumed rates of return, in
turn, drive pension asset allocation towards more equity. In the Netherlands, the main parameters for the
pension fund (such as the discount rate and the maximum expected rate of return on investments) are
dictated by the supervisor. The sponsor has no say on these parameters.
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debt6, implying again that sponsor contributions will be negatively related to sponsoring
firms ’ leverage.
2.5 Hypotheses
From the theoretical discussion above several hypotheses emerge concerning the
impact of sponsor characteristics on the funding and portfolio allocation of pension
funds. We formulate our hypotheses on the funding side in terms of sponsor con-
tributions, as the most direct measure of the sponsor’s funding policy.7 Table 1 pre-
sents nine hypotheses, together with their theoretical references.
In Table 1, we classify the hypotheses into two groups, according to whether they
address sponsor contributions or pension asset allocation. Thereby, we obviously do
Table 1. Hypotheses
H# Formulation Theoretical references
Hypotheses concerning funding
H1 Sponsor contributions are positively related
to sponsoring companies ’ profitability
Capital market imperfections
(Cooper and Ross, 2002)
H2 Sponsor contributions are negatively related
to sponsoring companies ’ leverage
Capital market imperfections
(Cooper and Ross, 2002, Arnott
and Gersovitz, 1980) and
risk shifting (Webb, 2007)
H3 Sponsor contributions are positively related
to sponsoring companies ’ leverage
Tax effects (Black, 1980,
Tepper, 1981)
H4 Sponsor contributions are positively related
to pension funds’ return on assets
Capital market imperfections
(Cooper and Ross, 2002)
H5 Sponsor contributions are positively related
to sponsoring firms’ company size
Capital market imperfections
(Cooper and Ross, 2002,
Arnott and Gersovitz, 1980)
Hypotheses concerning portfolio allocation
H6 Defined benefit pension funds invest more
in equity than defined contribution
pension funds
Risk shifting (Treynor, 1977)
H7 Defined benefit funds invest more in bonds
than defined contribution funds
Tax effects (Black, 1980,
Tepper, 1981)
H8 Defined benefit pension funds’ equity holdings are
positively related to sponsoring firms’ leverage
Risk shifting (Cocco and
Volpin, 2007)
H9 Defined benefit pension funds’ bond holdings are
positively related to sponsoring firms’ leverage
Risk management (Rauh, 2009),
Risk shifting (Broeders, 2010)
6 Complementing Cooper and Ross (2002), Ippolito (1985) sees underfunding as a way to improve a firm’s
bargaining position with labour unions. A prediction from this model is that most underfunding should
be found in the funds of unionised workers. This hypothesis cannot readily be tested for the Netherlands
since most firms are unionised.
7 The funding ratio – defined as the pension fund’s available assets over liabilities – is a poor proxy of the
sponsor’s funding policy because it is dominated by the investment performance of the fund. Analyses we
undertook, not reported here, confirmed this.
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not specify both the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis in case there is
only one hypothesis to test, as for example H1, H4 and H5. However, we specify both
hypotheses when different theories have diametrically opposed implications, as for
example H2 versus H3, H6 versus H7 and H8 versus H9.
The capital market imperfections and the offsetting risk shifting effects have not
been explicitly addressed in studies on pension funding and asset allocation that have
been reviewed in Section 1. However, several of the relationships predicted by these
theories have been examined in a different context. Friedman (1983) and Bodie et al.
(1987) test relationship H1 for the funding ratio of US pension plans, with opposite
conclusions (see Section 1). Cocco and Volpin (2007) test H1–H3 for UK firms and
find that firm profitability and leverage correlate positively and negatively with
sponsor contributions, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, H4 and H5 have
not been tested before.
As for pension asset allocation, H6 and H7 have implicitly been examined by
Petersen (1996), who finds that defined benefit plans invest marginally higher pro-
portions in equity and bonds compared to defined contribution plans. H8 and H9
have been examined before, with mixed results. Friedman (1983) finds that higher
leverage for US firms tends to be offset by more conservative investments of pension
assets, while Cocco and Volpin (2007) find that UK firms with higher leverage have
more equity investments in their pension plans, particularly when more of the firms’
executive directors are trustees in the fund. Gallo and Lockwood (1995) find that
more risky US firms invest greater amounts of pension assets in bonds. Rauh (2009)
includes pension funding status in his pension asset allocation regressions and finds
that underfunded pension plans invest more in safe securities, in line with the risk
management hypothesis.
3 Institutional setting
In this section, we first give a general picture of the Dutch pension system, followed
by Dutch regulatory and tax issues, after which we discuss how the Dutch institu-
tional setting may affect the predictions of the hypotheses given in the previous sec-
tion.
3.1 The Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system is remarkable for its high dependence on fully funded,
defined benefit occupational pensions. The Dutch pension system has two main tiers,
consisting of a flat-rate public pay-as-you-go scheme and earnings-related, fully
funded private schemes, mostly organized in pension funds. Most companies offer a
pension scheme to their employees, either through a corporate pension fund or by
participating in an industry-wide pension fund.8 If a pension scheme is offered, par-
ticipation is mandatory for the employee. The result is a coverage ratio of over 90%
for all workers (OPF&VB, 2010).
8 If there is an industry-wide pension scheme, employers are obliged to participate.
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As a result of this high coverage, the Dutch pension fund industry is well devel-
oped. In 2005, Dutch pension funds’ total assets amounted to $780 billion, which
accounts for more than half of all euro area pension assets (OECD, 2006). In relative
terms, the Netherlands has the worlds ’ largest pension fund industry (Figure 1).
During the period under investigation, the Dutch pension fund industry included
more than 800 pension funds, of which some 700 are corporate pension funds (the
subject of this study) and about 100 are industry-wide funds or funds for independent
professionals. Defined benefit schemes are still dominant in the Netherlands : 9 out of
10 workers have one. In recent years, many pension funds switched from final earn-
ings-based to career average-based pension schemes. The typical Dutch pension
scheme currently aims at building up a pension entitlement within 40 years, yielding a
benefit ranging from 70 to 80% of the career average wage (including the first pillar
flat rate benefit). Most career average-based schemes apply wage inflation indexation,
conditional on the fund’s financial health.
3.2 Regulation
Each Dutch corporate pension fund has to be organized in a legal entity, which is
separate and independent from the sponsoring company. Most pension funds are
foundations. Policy is determined by the fund’s board of trustees, with an equal
number of employer and employee representatives. Nevertheless, the trustees are
required to act independently and only in the fund’s interest. In principle, a pension
fund must be able to continue functioning for the benefit of all existing participants
even if the sponsoring company ceases to exist. In general, the sponsoring firm is not
liable to the pension fund when the former goes bankrupt. However, the pension
fund’s board may be found liable for mismanagement.
Some pension funds reinsure, fully or partly, their pension obligations via a re-
insurance company. In that case a premium is paid to the reinsurer who guarantees
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Figure 1. Assets of pension funds in OECD countries, 2005 (% GDP).
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the payment of pension benefits. In contrast to the US, there is no public pension
benefit insurance of any sort in the Netherlands.
The supervisory authority gives directions to individual funds concerning the
minimum capital requirements. The most important of these directions during the
period under investigation were the following:9
– Liabilities of the fund (accumulated benefit obligations) are valued using a fixed
discount rate with a maximum of 4%.
– Assets are valued at market prices, although in the earlier years of our sample
period pension funds were also allowed to value bonds by their redemption value.
– Basically, there are no investment restrictions, only a directive that investments
have to be ‘solid’. This precludes, for instance, large financial interests of the
pension fund in the sponsoring company.
– The reserves have to be sufficient to ensure solvency in the case of a 40% equity
price decline and a 10% bond price decline. For the average pension fund, this
implies a minimum funding ratio of 130% (PVK, 2002).10
– There are no formal restrictions to premium holidays or even refunds of employer
contributions, as long as the pension fund is in a healthy financial position ac-
cording to the supervisor. However, the firm cannot force the pension fund’s board
to grant premium holidays or refunds ; the employer has only 50% of the votes.
– If the funding ratio is insufficient, the pension fund’s board has the following op-
tions: a rise of contributions, limited or no indexation of pensions to the rate of
wage increases and, in the last resort, a reduction of pension rights. Another
possibility is that the sponsor incidentally pays a supplementary contribution over
the employer’s regular contributions already paid. However, there are no legal
obligations for the sponsor to do this, like in the US, in case of underfunding.
– In most cases, the sponsor agrees by contract to pay some regular contribution,
often some fixed percentage of the contributions paid by employees.11 Not paying
therefore may have legal consequences. Supplementary contributions by the
sponsor, paid when the funding ratio is too low, are discretionary.
3.3 Taxes
In the Netherlands, pension accumulation is stimulated through taxation measures.
Pension benefits are only taxed when they are received. No personal income tax
is levied on pension contributions. However, the growth of pension rights in the
pension fund is limited by the accrual rate, i.e. the percentage of pension entitlements
to be built by a participant for each year of service. For career average-based pension
9 Our data sample period covers 1996–2005, and hence falls before 2007 when a new, risk-based regulatory
regime came into force.
10 Although this benchmark was made explicit only in 2002, it also provides a reasonable approximation
for the period before as it reflects the Dutch pension funds’ common practice to provide for a pension
benefit in real terms. With an annual inflation rate of 2% (the inflation target of the ECB) a nominal
funding ratio of approximately 130% would translate into a real funding ratio of 100%.
11 Some of the corporate pension plans are collectively bargained. Unfortunately, we do not have infor-
mation on this.
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schemes, the accrual rate is set to 2.25%. The growth of pension rights via the pen-
sion fund’s investment performance remains untaxed.
For the sponsor, pension contributions are deductible for the corporate income
tax.12 However, regulations prevent a company paying additional contributions to
shield high profits from corporate income taxes. First, the growth of pension rights is
limited by the accrual rate, as mentioned above. Second, companies are not allowed
to pay contributions in advance. These stipulations make it very hard for a company
to pay more contributions than necessary if the pension fund’s financial position is
healthy. Moreover, it is impossible for the company to withdraw money from the
pension fund, as explained in Section 3.2. Hence, these limitations should diminish
any incentive for the sponsor to overfund the pension plan in profitable times and
take advantage of the tax shield, and then refund contributions to the sponsor in bad
times.
3.4 Implications for hypotheses
Some of the institutional characteristics described above are specific to the Dutch
pension system and, in several respects, differ from the situation in the US. Therefore,
the question arises how these characteristics may affect the validity of the nine
hypotheses, since most of these have been formulated with the US pension system in
mind.
H1 (sponsor contributions are positively related to sponsoring companies ’ profit-
ability) seems to be relevant for the Netherlands. When the firm is profitable, it is
likely that the employer’s representatives in the pension fund’s board agree to pay
more contributions (as suggested by Cooper and Ross, 2002).
H2 (sponsor contributions are negatively related to sponsoring companies’ lever-
age) seems to be less likely as, in the Netherlands, sponsor and pension fund are two
separate legal entities and mandatory supplementary sponsor contributions in case of
pension deficits are absent. Hence, pension deficits are not to be considered as a debt
burden to the sponsoring firm (as suggested byWebb, 2007). On the other hand, if the
sponsor is financially constrained, its representatives in the pension fund’s board may
renegotiate lower contributions (as suggested by Cooper and Ross, 2002).
H3 (sponsor contributions are positively related to the sponsor’s leverage) seems to
be relevant for the Netherlands. This is because Black’s (1980) arbitrage story is
applicable to the Netherlands, as sponsor contributions and interest payments are tax
deductible, while interest income in the pension fund is tax exempt.
H4 (sponsor contributions are positively related to pension funds’ return on assets)
seems to be less likely as, in the Netherlands, the sponsor’s representatives in the
pension fund’s board are more likely to renegotiate lower rather than higher con-
tributions when the pension fund’s investment income is sufficiently high to sustain its
funding ratio at the required level.
H5 (sponsor contributions are positively related to sponsoring firms’ company
size) seems relevant for the Netherlands. If smaller firms are more likely to be
12 The corporate tax rate during the sample period was 35.0% in 1996–2000, 34.5% in 2002–2004 and
31.5% in 2005.
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financially constrained than larger firms, the representatives of a smaller company
in the pension fund’s board may more often renegotiate lower contributions
than the representatives of a larger company (as suggested by Cooper and Ross,
2002).
H6 (defined benefit pension funds invest more in equity than defined contribution
pension funds) follows from the risk shifting theory, according to which Treynor’s
(1977) default option increases in value with more equity investments. This theory
seems to be less valid for the Netherlands, where sponsor and fund are two separate
legal entities, implying that the value of the default option is relatively low. However,
when bond yields are relatively low, as they were during the sample period, the em-
ployees ’ representatives in the defined benefit pension fund’s board may wish to
invest more, not less, in equity, thereby hoping to generate a higher level of invest-
ment return and avoid missing indexation.
Tax incentives leading to the opposite H7 (defined benefit funds invest more in
bonds than defined contribution funds) seem to be relevant because the tax arbitrage
story of Black (1980) is applicable to the Netherlands. However, for reasons men-
tioned with respect to H6, the employees’ representatives in the defined benefit pen-
sion fund’s board may wish to invest more, not less, in equity.
H8 (pension funds’ equity holdings are positively related to the sponsor’s leverage)
seems to be less likely. If the default option has low value anyhow because of the strict
separation of sponsor and pension fund into two legal entities, more risky invest-
ments with higher leverage would have little effect of bringing the default option
closer into the money (as suggested by Cocco and Volpin, 2007).
The contrasting H9 (pension funds’ bond holdings are positively related to the
sponsor’s leverage) also seems to be less likely as, in the Netherlands, mandatory
supplementary sponsor contributions are absent, implying that pension deficits are
not likely to drive sponsors into financial distress (as suggested by Rauh, 2009).
Hence, there is less need to compensate financial risk in the firm by safer investments
in the pension fund.
4 Methodology
The hypotheses formulated above are tested using empirical data for around 200
Dutch pension funds between 1996 and 2005. In the model that is estimated, the
dependent variable y is a function of a set of hypothesized explanatory variables x
and a set of control variables z :
yit=xi, tx1a+xib+zi, tx1d+ui+eit, ð1Þ
where i denotes either the firm or the pension fund and t is the time operator. xi,tx1
and zi,tx1 are vectors of variables that vary over pension funds (or firms) and
time, xi is a vector of time-invariant variables (‘dummy’ variables), which vary only
over pension funds (or firms). ui are the individual effects, eit is the disturbance term
assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process eit=eitx1r+mit. All (time-
varying) independent variables have been lagged one year, to reduce simultaneity
bias.
450 E. Philip Davis and Leo de Haan
From the hypotheses formulated above, four models are estimated with as depen-
dent variable, respectively:
1. The sponsoring firm’s contributions to the pension fund, scaled by the fund’s total
assets (hypotheses H1–H5).
2. The ratio of equity holdings to total assets for the pension fund (H6 and H8).
3. The ratio of bond holdings (including mortgages and other loans) to total assets
for the pension fund (H7 and H9).13
Five explanatory variables, as hypothesized above, are tested:
1. The sponsoring firm’s leverage, measured by total debt over total assets (H2, H3,
H8 and H9).
2. The sponsoring firm’s profitability, measured by return on total assets (H1).
3. The sponsoring firm’s size, measured by the logarithm of total assets (H5).
4. The pension fund’s profitability, measured by return on total assets (H4).
5. A ‘defined benefit dummy’ variable, which is 1 for a defined benefit fund and 0 for
a defined contribution fund (H6 and H7).
The following set of control variables is added to account for other factors de-
termining sponsor contributions and portfolio allocation:
– The pension fund’s size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger
funds are more sophisticated investors than smaller funds (De Dreu and Bikker,
2009), which impacts asset allocation. We expect that fund size increases the pro-
portion of equity investments in total assets and decreases the proportion of bonds.
– The pension fund’s maturity, defined as the proportion of inactive participants. A
less mature fund has fewer immediate obligations and therefore may be less risk
averse than a mature fund that has a large proportion of pensioners. We expect that
pension funds with a large proportion of retired participants invest less in equity.14
– The pension fund’s use of reinsurance, defined as the proportion of pension li-
abilities that has been reinsured. The use of reinsurance is a way to decrease in-
surance risk and may also be used as a signalling device to signal financial
soundness. This would mean that more reinsurance allows for more risky invest-
ment. On the other hand, reinsurers may put restrictions on the portfolio allocation
toward risky assets. Hence, the effect of reinsurance on asset allocation is am-
biguous.
– Indexation of obligations demands additional funding efforts. We expect pension
funds with conditional indexation or no indexation to receive lower sponsor con-
tributions than fully indexed funds. Two dummy variables are therefore introduced
as control variables. A ‘conditional indexation dummy’, taking a value of 1 if
13 Dutch pension funds invest in bonds, mortgages, and other loans. We take these investment categories
together to represent the ‘ less risky’ investments that theory often opposes to the more risky investments
in equity. In the remainder of this paper, we will shortly refer to ‘bonds’ and ‘equity’.
14 The age distribution of active participants may affect asset allocation as well, since it determines the
duration of liabilities and hence the shortfall risk, with older workers typically entailing less equity and
more bonds. See e.g. Alestalo and Puttonen (2006) for evidence for Finland and Bikker et al. (2011) for
the Netherlands. Our dataset lacks information on participants’ age.
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indexation in year t is conditional on the financial position of the pension fund and
0 otherwise, and a ‘no-indexation dummy’, with value 1 if there is no indexation at
all and 0 otherwise.
– Year dummies. These should capture effects of macro-economic trends, common to
all funds.15
– The pension fund’s funding ratio, defined as the fund’s available assets over li-
abilities.16 As a result of supervisory requirements (Section 3.2), we expect a posi-
tive relationship between the funding ratio and the proportion of equity
investments. For sponsor contributions, we expect a negative relationship with the
funding ratio, as the sponsor will have to contribute less when the funding ratio is
already high.
– The pension fund’s equity holdings. When modelling sponsor contributions, the
fund’s equity holdings are included as a control variable. We have no prior as to the
relationship between equity holdings and sponsor contributions.
We regress each of the three dependent variables under consideration on the sets of
explanatory and control variables introduced above. Pension funds’ funding ratio,
use of reinsurance, and equity and bond holdings are instrumented by their lagged
values when included as controls.17 We use generalized least squares (GLS), allowing
for the presence of autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and
heteroskedasticity across panels.18
5 Data
Individual corporate pension fund data were obtained from the supervisory auth-
ority, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). These data include sponsoring firms’ con-
tributions as received by the pension funds.19 The data for the sponsoring companies
have been taken from Bureau van Dijk’s Reach. We connect fund and sponsor data
into one dataset, dropping pension funds–observations for which data for sponsoring
firms are not available. Whereas for large, listed firms sponsor data were fully avail-
able, it was hard to find sponsor data notably for small, unlisted firms. Combining
fund to firm data restricts our sample to around 240 pension funds. We also delete
outliers with a funding ratio higher than 300% and drop funds that were almost fully
15 Time dummies may also capture any structural breaks. To our knowledge, there have been no disruptive
structural breaks in the supervisory framework during the sample period.
16 The funding ratio is only calculated for the defined benefit pension funds in the sample (92% of the
sample). Obviously, it is by definition 100% for the defined contribution pension plans (8% of the
sample).
17 Simultaneity is highly improbable for the hypothesized explanatory variables that reflect sponsoring
firm’s characteristics.
18 We also experimented with less sophisticated estimators such as OLS. Reported GLS results are in most
cases similar to those obtained with the between-effects estimator. Within-estimation did not produce a
good fit. As the time variation in the data is much lower than the cross-sectional variation, within-
estimation loses too much information. We verified the appropriateness of random effects using the
Hausman specification test.
19 As we do not have data on ‘pension expense’ from the sponsors’ income statements, we cannot examine
whether smoothing mechanisms as identified by Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) are relevant for the
Netherlands.
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reinsured. This leaves us with a dataset containing around 200 pension funds and
firms.
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of pension funds and
sponsoring firms. Because of the restriction of the sample size as a consequence of
Table 2. Summary statistics 1996–2005
Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Number of
observations
Panel A. Population of pension funds
Pension Funds
Contributions from sponsor 0.412 0.035 11.438 6144
Equity holdings 0.237 0.237 0.205 6823
Bond holdings 0.516 0.579 0.297 6831
Funding ratio 1.309 1.239 0.284 5016
Fund size 9.802 10.063 2.372 6873
Maturity 0.342 0.286 0.264 5991
Profitability 0.180 0.012 11.645 6112
Use of reinsurance 0.026 0.000 0.087 5383
Panel B. Sample of pension funds and sponsoring firms
Pension Funds
Contributions from sponsor 0.041 0.028 0.059 1696
Equity holdings 0.315 0.318 0.157 1761
Bond holdings 0.545 0.562 0.202 1756
Funding ratio 1.289 1.234 0.242 1612
Fund size 11.419 11.520 1.626 1720
Maturity 0.341 0.306 0.225 1736
Profitability 0.008 0.017 0.069 1672
Use of reinsurance 0.024 0.000 0.079 1669
Sponsoring firms
Leverage 0.667 0.679 0.218 1685
Profitability 0.068 0.064 0.086 1649
Firm size 12.470 12.462 2.111 1738
Of which: Listed firms
Leverage 0.648 0.662 0.142 573
Profitability 0.073 0.081 0.071 569
Firm size 13.947 13.833 1.739 559
Non-listed firms
Leverage 0.676 0.688 0.248 1112
Profitability 0.064 0.051 0.093 1080
Firm size 11.770 11.807 1.900 1179
Difference between listed and non-listed firms
Leverage x0.028*** x0.026***
Profitability 0.009** 0.030***
Firm size 2.177*** 2.026***
Explanatory note : Differences in means and medians between listed and non-listed firms have
been tested using t and Pearson’s x2-test, respectively; ** and *** denote significance at the 5
and 1% level, respectively.
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combining pension fund data with relatively scarce sponsoring firm data, the
representativeness of the sample may be an issue. To assess this, in panel A, we also
give summary statistics for the population of pension funds, which can be
compared to the sample. Table 2 shows that means and medians for funding
ratio, bond holdings, maturity, and reinsurance are quite similar for sample and
population. The means for profitability and sponsor contributions differ, but
taking account of the standard deviations these differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. In general, the population has higher standard deviations than the
sample indicating that the sample selection resulted in less heterogeneity. Funds in
the sample have higher equity holdings and are considerably larger compared to the
population, though. This is due to the fact that it was hard to find sponsor data for
small pension funds of unlisted firms. As a result, there is a selection bias towards
larger pension funds that invest more into equity (see Section 6). Nevertheless, for
most pension variables, the distributional characteristics between sample and popu-
lation do not differ substantially, which makes the sample sufficiently representative
of the population.
The firm data are also given for listed and non-listed companies, separately, as
this distinction will turn out to be important in the empirical part. Listed firms are
larger than non-listed firms, have lower leverage, and are more profitable. The dis-
tinction between listed and non-listed firms in the empirical part of the paper is
principally motivated by statistical considerations. First, the standard deviations
indicate that heterogeneity among non-listed firms is greater than among listed
firms. Second, listed firms represent the population, whereas the non-listed firms
included are only a part of the full sample. Therefore, the results for the listed firms
are expected to be more representative and statistically stronger than the results for
the non-listed firms. Of course, there are also economic differences between listed
and unlisted firms that are worth mentioning. Unlisted firms disclose less infor-
mation and are more opaque than listed firms (e.g. Buzby, 1975). Loderer and
Waelchli (2010) find that controlling shareholders have a tighter grip on unlisted
firms. These authors further assess that both listed and unlisted firms face similar
potential conflicts of interest (i.e. between existing shareholders and new share-
holders, between management and shareholders). As the potential implications of
these differences between listed and unlisted firms for the funding and asset allo-
cation of pension funds are not evident, they will not be explored further in this
paper.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the funding ratio over the sample period. A
funding ratio of 1 (i.e. 100%) means that the available assets are exactly equal to the
minimum required assets set by the supervisor. There are funds in the sample that
occasionally had funding ratios below this level (see the ‘minimum’ observations).
The fifth percentile of the distribution was slightly above 1 during most of the sample
period. The median fund’s funding ratio deteriorated from 1.35 in 2000 to 1.08 in
2002, largely due to the sharp fall in stock prices during the dotcom crash. For the
99th percentile, the fall of the funding ratio was even more dramatic, as pension funds
with such high levels of funding typically hold more equity. The dotcom crash in the
stock market manifested itself globally. The development of the funding ratio of
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Dutch pension funds is therefore representative of other countries ’ defined benefit
pension fund sectors.20
6 Estimation results
The first columns of Tables 3–5 show the regression results for all (around 200) firms.
The second and third columns present results for the listed and non-listed firms,
respectively.21 This enables us to detect any differences between these two types of
firms.
6.1 Sponsor contributions
Table 3 presents results for the sponsor contributions. All sponsor variables (lever-
age, profitability and size) are statistically significant for the full sample; theWald test
rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of these variables are all zero.
Profitable and large firms are found to contribute more to their pension funds,
which supports the capital market imperfections hypotheses H1 and H5. When the
firm is profitable and less often financially constrained thanks to its size, the em-
ployer’s representatives in the pension fund’s board are more likely to agree with
paying higher contributions (as suggested by Cooper and Ross, 2002).
We find a positive relation of firm leverage to sponsor contributions. This finding
supports tax effects hypothesis H3 according to which the sponsor may benefit from
0.5
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2.0
2.5
3.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
99th percentile
Median
5th percentile
Minimum
Figure 2. Distribution of funding ratio (ratio of assets to liabilities).
20 See, for example, Davis (2004) on UK developments which parallel those in the Netherlands.
21 One company is counted both listed and unlisted, because it got a listing during the sample period and is
consequently counted unlisted in the years before going public and counted listed thereafter.
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Table 3. Estimation results for sponsor contributions
All firms Listed firms Non-listed firms
Hypothesized variables Predicted sign
from hypotheses
Sponsoring firm’s profitabilitytx1 H1:+ 0.003* (0.002) 0.014 (0.009) 0.003* (0.002)
Sponsoring firm’s leveragetx1 H2:x H3:+ 0.004** (0.001) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.002 (0.001)
Pension fund’s profitabilitytx1 H4:+ x0.018** (0.007) 0.002 (0.002) x0.035*** (0.011)
Sponsoring firm’s sizetx1 H5:+ 0.003*** (0.0004) 0.005*** (0.0005) 0.001** (0.0004)
Control variables
Pension fund’s funding ratiotx1 x0.039*** (0.004) x0.044*** (0.006) x0.041*** (0.006)
Pension fund’s sizetx1 x0.003*** (0.0005) x0.005*** (0.0006) x0.003*** (0.0007)
Pension fund’s maturitytx1 x0.055*** (0.002) x0.064*** (0.004) x0.048*** (0.003)
Pension fund’s equity holdingstx1 x0.025** (0.009) x0.054*** (0.012) 0.010 (0.012)
Pension fund’s use of reinsurancetx1 0.077*** (0.018) 0.159** (0.067) 0.061*** (0.021)
Conditional indexation dummy x0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) x0.001 (0.003)
No indexation dummy x0.003 (0.004) x0.006 (0.010) x0.003 (0.004)
Wald test for sponsor variables 52.36*** 132.93*** 7.08*
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.511 0.250
Number of observations 1098 381 717
Number of funds 207 59 149
Explanatory note : The feasible GLS estimator has been used, allowing for the presence of first-order autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Funding ratio, equity holdings and use of reinsurance have been instrumented by lagged values.
Standard errors are given within parentheses ; *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Year dummies and an
intercept have been included (not reported). Wald test gives the x2 statistic for the overall statistical significance of the sponsoring firm’s variables.
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Table 4. Estimation results for pension fund’s equity holdings
All firms Listed firms Non-listed firms
Hypothesized variables Predicted sign from hypotheses
Defined benefit dummy H6:+ ; H7:x x0.036 (0.029) 0.062*** (0.016) x0.042 (0.027)
Sponsoring firm’s leveragetx1 H8:+ ; H9:x x0.000 (0.005) 0.037 (0.029) x0.002 (0.006)
Control variables
Sponsoring firm’s profitabilitytx1 0.008 (0.008) 0.027 (0.030) 0.009 (0.009)
Sponsoring firm’s sizetx1 0.007*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.010*** (0.002)
Pension fund’s funding ratiotx1 0.114*** (0.021) 0.174*** (0.036) 0.105*** (0.025)
Pension fund’s profitabilitytx1 x0.142 (0.099) 0.070 (0.170) x0.101 (0.099)
Pension fund’s sizetx1 0.035*** (0.003) 0.038*** (0.004) 0.036*** (0.003)
Pension fund’s maturitytx1 x0.046*** (0.016) 0.046 (0.033) x0.077*** (0.016)
Pension fund’s use of reinsurancetx1 x0.327*** (0.108) x0.155** (0.522) x0.254** (0.125)
Conditional indexation dummy 0.024 (0.019) 0.026 (0.035) 0.030 (0.023)
No indexation dummy 0.048** (0.023) 0.086* (0.047) 0.043 (0.029)
Wald test for sponsor variables 13.22*** 2.47 34.55***
Pseudo R2 0.288 0.402 0.327
Number of observations 1101 379 722
Number of funds 208 58 151
Explanatory note : The feasible GLS estimator has been used, allowing for the presence of first-order autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Funding ratio, fund profitability and the use of reinsurance have been instrumented by their lagged
values. Standard errors are given within parentheses ; *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Year dummies and
an intercept have been included (not reported). Wald test gives the x2 statistic for the overall statistical significance of the sponsoring firm’s variables.
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Table 5. Estimation results for pension fund’s bond holdings
All firms Listed firms Non-listed firms
Hypothesized variables Predicted sign from hypotheses
Defined benefit dummy H6:x ; H7:+ 0.024 (0.037) x0.169*** (0.020) 0.050 (0.039)
Sponsoring firm’s leveragetx1 H8:x ; H9:+ x0.007 (0.007) x0.017 (0.028) x0.006 (0.006)
Control variables
Sponsoring firm’s profitabilitytx1 x0.006 (0.012) 0.017 (0.033) x0.012 (0.013)
Sponsoring firm’s sizetx1 x0.006*** (0.002) x0.022*** (0.005) x0.004* (0.002)
Pension fund’s funding ratiotx1 x0.145*** (0.024) x0.112*** (0.041) x0.155*** (0.024)
Pension fund’s profitabilitytx1 x0.255** (0.114) 0.077 (0.190) x0.486*** (0.131)
Pension fund’s sizetx1 x0.026*** (0.003) x0.021*** (0.006) x0.023*** (0.003)
Pension fund’s maturitytx1 x0.008 (0.017) x0.087** (0.036) 0.007 (0.019)
Pension fund’s use of reinsurancetx1 0.090 (0.151) 2.122*** (0.444) x0.052 (0.177)
Conditional indexation dummy x0.028 (0.021) x0.037 (0.029) x0.054* (0.033)
No indexation dummy x0.101** (0.026) x0.049 (0.059) x0.132*** (0.036)
Wald test for sponsor variables 9.96** 26.91*** 5.13
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.438 0.114
Number of observations 1101 379 722
Number of funds 208 58 151
Explanatory note : The feasible GLS estimator has been used, allowing for the presence of first-order autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Funding ratio, fund profitability and the use of reinsurance have been instrumented by their lagged
values. Standard errors are given within parentheses ; *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Year dummies and
an intercept have been included (not reported). Wald test gives the x2 statistic for the overall statistical significance of the sponsoring firm’s variables.
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the tax deductibility of both pension contributions and interest payments on debt
(Black, 1980). This evidence rejects the opposite hypothesis H2 following from the
risk shifting theory and the capital market imperfections theory. As indicated in
Section 3.4, Webb’s (2007) risk shifting argument seems to be less relevant for the
Netherlands because of the strict legal separation of the sponsor and the pension fund
and the absence of mandatory supplementary sponsor contributions. The rejection of
Cooper and Ross’s (2002) capital market imperfections prediction suggests that
Dutch sponsors take tax incentives more into consideration than financial con-
straints.
The results for the sponsor contributions show a significantly negative effect of the
pension fund’s performance (except for listed firms where the effect is insignificant).
The negative effect on sponsor contributions suggests that sponsors contribute less,
not more, when their pension funds are making more profits. Hence, capital markets
hypothesis H4, according to which firms are more willing to pay higher contributions
if the pension fund’s investment performance is good (Cooper and Ross, 2002), is
rejected. This result suggests that Dutch sponsors ’ board representatives are more
likely to renegotiate lower rather than higher contributions when the pension fund’s
investment income is high.
As to the control variables, the funding ratio has a negative coefficient, which
suggests that sponsors contribute less when their pension funds are already funded
well. This finding confirms the results of Cocco and Volpin (2007) for the UK. Rauh
(2009) argues that a similar finding for the US may reflect the existence of mandatory
supplementary contributions for US firms. As mandatory supplementary contribu-
tions are absent in the Netherlands, our finding is not driven by this factor.
We further find that sponsor contributions are generally lower for larger and more
mature pension funds. Sponsor contributions, especially by listed firms, are lower for
pension funds with higher equity investments. According to Black (1980) and Tepper
(1981), tax reasons may cause firms to contribute less when pension assets are allo-
cated in equity and not in bonds. Sponsor contributions are found to be higher for
funds using reinsurance, maybe because of stipulations of reinsurers.
6.2 Portfolio allocation
In this section, we test the hypotheses on pension funds’ portfolio allocation. Tables 4
and 5 present the results for the proportion of equity and bonds in the pension fund’s
assets, respectively. We discuss these tables together as equity and bonds form the
two major counterparts in funds’ portfolios, so that most of the coefficients in the
equations for equity and bonds have opposite signs.
The defined benefit dummy coefficient is positive for equity and negative for bonds,
particularly for listed firms, which implies that defined benefit funds invest more in
equity and less in bonds than their defined contribution counterparts. This is con-
sistent with H6 and inconsistent with H7, suggesting that risk shifting incentives
(Treynor, 1977) play a bigger role for Dutch firms than tax shield considerations
(Black, 1980). However, as explained in Section 3.4, the risk shifting argument
is probably not so much the reason for this result than the incentives of Dutch
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employees’ board representatives to promote equity investments as a way to generate
higher investment returns and avoid missing indexation.
Unlike Cocco and Volpin (2007), sponsoring firms’ leverage is found to be stat-
istically insignificant for the asset allocation of pension funds, rejecting both H8 and
H9. This result is consistent with our expectation (Section 3.4) that neither risk
shifting nor risk management incentives are very relevant for the Dutch case, because
of the strict legal separation of sponsor and pension fund and the absence of man-
datory supplementary contributions, respectively.
The effects of the control variables are generally in line with our expectations. We
find a significantly positive relationship between a pension fund’s funding ratio and
its equity investments, and a negative one with investment in bonds, as was also
found by Rauh (2009). This partly reflects regulation, which takes portfolio risk into
account when setting minimum funding requirements. Required funding ratios are
higher for funds that invest more in risky assets such as equity. Further, we find that
larger funds invest more in equity and less in bonds. Large funds, often being rela-
tively sophisticated investors, can better diversify risk in their portfolio and are
therefore able to invest more in equity. More mature funds, having shorter invest-
ment horizons, are found to invest less in equity. This result corroborates the findings
of Rauh (2009). As an exception to the mirroring of the coefficients ’ signs for equity
and bonds, more mature funds also invest less, not more, in bonds, although this
finding is only statistically significant for listed firms. Unreported regression results
indicate that more mature funds invest more in other cash-like assets, such as deposits
and short-term loans. The results further suggest that funds that use more re-
insurance generally invest less in equity, and more in bonds (although the latter is
found only for listed firms’ funds), maybe because of stipulations of reinsurers.
Unlike Petersen (1996), sponsors’ profitability is found to be insignificant.
Summarizing the evidence, the results seem to be mixed. Table 6 presents a sum-
mary of the findings. The table gives for the nine hypotheses the predicted and esti-
mated signs of the relation between the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables ; ‘+ ’ denotes a positive relation, ‘x ’ a negative one. For the sponsor con-
tributions, the evidence is consistent with theories of capital market imperfections
and tax effects. For the asset allocation between equity and bonds, the finding that
defined benefit pension funds invest more in equity and less in bonds is in accordance
with the risk shifting theory. However, the desire of the employees to increase in-
vestment yields so as not to miss indexation probably played a bigger role. We do not
find any significant effects of the sponsoring firms’ leverage on pension asset allo-
cation decisions.
7 Conclusion
This study presents empirical evidence on the funding and portfolio allocation of
corporate pension funds, with a special focus on the influence of the sponsoring firm.
Nine hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature are tested using data for around
200 Dutch corporate pension funds and their sponsoring firms over the period
1996–2005. Several of the hypotheses have not been examined before in the empirical
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Table 6. Summary of findings
Dependent variable:
Sponsor contributions Equity holdings Bond holdings
Predicted Estimated Predicted Estimated Predicted Estimated
Hypothesis Theory Explanatory variable
H1 Capital market imperfections Sponsor profitability + +
H2 Capital market imperfections,
risk shifting
Sponsor leverage x +
H3 Tax effects Sponsor leverage + +
H4 Capital market imperfections Pension fund profitability + x
H5 Capital market imperfections Sponsor size + +
H6 Risk shifting Defined benefit + + x x
H7 Tax effects Defined benefit x + + x
H8 Risk shifting Sponsor leverage + 0 x 0
H9 Risk management, risk shifting Sponsor leverage x 0 + 0
Explanatory note : ‘Predicted’ gives the signs of the relations between the dependent and the explanatory variables as predicted by the hypotheses; ‘+ ’
and ‘x ’ denote a ‘positive’, ‘negative’ sign. ‘Estimated’ gives the signs of the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables, where ‘+ ’ and ‘x ’
denote that at least one significantly positive, negative coefficient was found for either ‘all firms’, ‘ listed firms’ or ‘unlisted firms’; ‘0 ’ denotes that no
statistically significant coefficient was found at all.
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literature. Moreover, this study is the first to address the issue of the relationship
between sponsor and pension finance for the Netherlands.
As for the sponsor’s influence on pension finance, the results for the funding side
indicate that unprofitable and small firms contribute less to their pension funds than
profitable and large firms, consistent with theories of capital market imperfections.
Sponsor contributions are found to be positively correlated with leverage, suggesting
that tax effects play a role.
The results for pension asset allocation indicate that defined benefit funds invest
relatively more in equity and less in bonds than their defined contribution counter-
parts, which is in accordance with the risk shifting theory. We do not find any sig-
nificant effects of leverage on pension asset allocation decisions.
Hence, the results seem to be mixed. On the funding side, the evidence is consistent
with theories of capital market imperfections and taxes. On the asset allocation side,
some of the evidence is in accordance with the risk shifting theory.
The findings for the control variables used in explaining funding and asset allo-
cation are mostly in line with theoretical predictions and corroborate some of the
earlier findings for the US and the UK. Sponsors contribute less to well-funded funds
and more to underfunded ones. As mandatory supplementary sponsor contributions
are non-existent in the Netherlands, this mostly reflects unrestricted sponsor policy.
Large, well funded and less mature funds are found to invest more in equity.
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